U nlike the first 2 editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I 1 and DSM-II, 2 respectively), DSM-III, 3 for the first time, included a definition of mental disorder in its introduction. The brief definition was derived from a much longer and more elaborate definition of mental disorder, along with a definition of the broader category of medical disorder, earlier put forward by Robert Spitzer and Jean Endicott. 4 Spitzer's inclusion of an analysis of mental disorder in DSM-III was largely motivated by his desire to intellectually justify the manual's controversial elimination of ego-syntonic homosexuality from disorder status in 1973. The DSM-III acknowledged (as has every edition since) that the concept of mental disorder has inherent limitations of precision and will have fuzzy rather than precise boundaries (" [t] here is no satisfactory definition that specifies precise boundaries for the concept 'mental disorder'" 3, p 5 ), but noted that this is "also true for such concepts as physical disorder and mental and physical health." 3, p 5-6 However, the DSM-III maintained that, despite the limitations, the definition of disorder needed to be made explicit because it impacted decisions about whether conditions were included in the manual: "Nevertheless, it is useful to present concepts that have influenced the decision to include certain conditions in DSM-III as mental disorders and to exclude others." 3, p 6 The definition required that, for a condition to be considered a mental disorder, it must cause harm in the form of distress or impairment of social functioning, and it must be due to a dysfunction (that is, something having gone wrong with some psychological mechanism) inside the person.
In fact, there is no evidence-and Spitzer has never claimed-that the specific DSM-III definition of mental disorder was explicitly consulted in deliberations to decide what to include in DSM-III, except perhaps as an idea in the agile head of Robert Spitzer as he guided the DSM-III revision process. Nevertheless, intuitions about what is and is not a disorder that were captured in Spitzer's analysis were involved throughout the DSM-III deliberations. Should a bereavement exclusion be incorporated into the major depressive disorder (MDD) diagnostic criteria? Is racism a mental disorder? Is marital incompatibility a mental disorder? What belongs in the V codes that list nondisordered, problematic conditions for which clinicians are often consulted (for example, parent-child conflict and occupational challenges)? All these and many more fundamental questions and decisions depended on intuitions derived from the meaning of the concept of disorder.
Essentially the same definition of mental disorder remained in the DSM introduction over the following editions, with minor revisions intended to address specific problems. For example, in DSM-III-R, 5 the DSM-III concept of harm (defined as actual distress or disability) was expanded to include the risk of developing distress, disability, death, or loss of freedom. This change was partly designed (misguidedly, we would argue, but that is another story) to allow diagnosis of ego-syntonic pedophilia based on the harm of the risk of potentially being imprisoned owing to the illegality of sexual activity with a child. However, as far as one can tell, a lack of systematic application of the definition of disorder to the formulation of the diagnostic criteria in the manual has been the rule across editions. According to the introduction to DSM-III-R, when a diagnostic proposal "involved dropping a category from the DSM-III classification (e.g., Ego-dystonic Homosexuality) or adding a new diagnosis to the classification (e.g., Late
Luteal Phase Dysphoric Disorder)," it was asked, "Does the proposed category meet the requirements of the DSM-III definition of mental disorder?" 5, p xxi Thus the definition's use was again limited to the very narrow set of issues concerned with eliminating or introducing categories.
So it has been with every revision. The definition of mental disorder has been consistently cited as a factor influencing which conditions should be included as disorders, but, beyond that, its role in shaping the manual in any formal sense has been minimal. For example, in the case of the DSM-5, 6 the process of revising the definition of mental disorder was undertaken in parallel with, rather than prior to, the overall revision process. Competing proposals for the definition of mental disorder were being floated until near the end of the revision process, and substantial changes in the wording of the final definition were made at the very last minute, just prior to submission of the manuscript to the publisher. Thus in no way could the nuances of the revised definition have played a serious role in the overall deliberations about diagnostic criteria. One exception is that the proposal to eliminate the risk of distress or disability as a sufficient criterion for the harmfulness of a condition, 7 a proposal that was eventually accepted, did enter into the discussion of the proposed category of psychotic risk disorder (later renamed attenuated psychotic syndrome), which, in its initial form, seemed to confuse risk of disorder with actual disorder.
The virtually exclusive focus on the very limited traditional role of making decisions about inclusion or exclusion of categories has obscured the powerful and much broader role that the definition of mental disorder can and ought to play in DSM revisions. It leaves out an entire dimension of the story. The DSM-III revolution was motivated, in part, by problems that afflicted the legitimacy of psychiatry at the time. These included, among other issues, the unreliability of diagnosis, unproven psychoanalytic etiological assumptions contained within the DSM-II glossary definitions, and the antipsychiatry movement's accusation that the psychiatric profession was medically labelling and controlling socially disapproved behaviour. All this led some to fear for the very existence of the discipline, a fear fuelled by decreasing numbers of applications for psychiatry residencies.
The definition of mental disorder represented a powerful intellectual vision of how to ensure the integrity of psychiatry as a medical discipline. It was meant to remove psychiatry from the accusations of the antipsychiatry movement that psychiatry arbitrarily places spurious disorder labels on socially disapproved behaviour that is not in fact disordered in the medical sense. As such, the definition of mental disorder, even if honoured more in the breach than in the observance, was an integral part of the rationale for the DSM-III revolution. The definition in a conceptual sense is at the foundation of psychiatry's new social contract, brokered by DSM-III's chair Robert Spitzer, that resolved the crisis in psychiatry. For, without the backing of an acceptable definition of mental disorder, the operationalized symptom syndromes listed in the manual would just be so many descriptions of human woe.
The symptom-based descriptive criteria introduced in DSM-III addressed many urgent problems, such as diagnostic unreliability and psychoanalytic theoretical biases. However, in and of themselves, syndromes of co-occurring symptoms can represent normal distress or social deviance as well as mental disorder. It is only a syndrome's satisfaction of the definition of mental disorder's harm and dysfunction criteria that in principle provides the needed answer to the critics of psychiatry. To be valid, diagnostic criteria must be formulated so that the syndrome is not only harmful but also plausibly implies the presence of a dysfunction. The goal that the diagnostic criteria for each category of disorder should in fact validly pick out disorders and exclude nondisorders is labelled conceptual validity. 8 The presumption that DSM categories represented attempts to achieve conceptual validity, however fallibly and approximately, provided a new legitimacy to psychiatry.
Conceptual validity must be distinguished from 2 other desirable forms of validity of diagnostic criteria. The first is differential diagnostic validity, in which the criteria successfully distinguish the intended syndrome from other syndromes with overlapping symptoms, allowing adequate differential diagnosis (for example, incorporating criteria that help to distinguish MDD from bipolar disorder, or generalized anxiety disorder from panic disorder). The second is construct validity, in which criteria carve nature at the joints by picking out just one kind of condition with a distinctive underlying etiology. Most of the syndromes identified by current DSM diagnostic categories, it is generally agreed, 9, 10 do not yet have construct validity and likely subsume multiple disorders with distinct pathogeneses that will eventually have to be disentangled. For example, there are likely several different etiologies of the DSM category of MDD, and likewise several different disorders subsumed under schizophrenia. Construct validity is desirable because it offers the greatest chance for developing novel and carefully targeted empirically supported treatments, but it requires further scientific progress in understanding etiology. Meanwhile, diagnostic validity can be served by working to formulate diagnostic criteria that are at least as conceptually valid as possible and do not encompass substantial parts of the normal domain within DSM syndromal categories, a surprisingly challenging task for operationalized diagnostic criteria. Conceptual validity does not strictly depend on either differential diagnostic validity (for example, the generalized anxiety disorder and panic disorder criteria may both be formulated to pick out only disorders even if there is an overlap and lack of clear differentiation between the 2 syndromes) or construct validity (for example, even if MDD encompasses several etiologies, the criteria may be fashioned to identify only disorders, irrespective of etiology).
This points to how the definition of mental disorder should have been used and ought to, henceforth, be used in DSM revisions. An integral part of the mission of each DSM revision is to defend and extend the conceptual legacy of DSM-III. In fact, many DSM criteria changes are changes that, whether explicitly or implicitly, attempt to bring criteria sets more into conformity with the definition of mental disorder, as previous conceptual errors become apparent over time. This goal should become more explicit in the future. The proper role of the definition of disorder is as the regulating principle by which diagnostic criteria should be judged, formulated, and reformulated in the quest for conceptual validity.
In part 1 of this special, 2-part In Review on the concept of mental disorder, which appeared in the November issue of The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, our Guest Editorial, 11 papers by Dr Rachel V Cooper 12 and Dr Derek Bolton, 13 and our final Perspective piece 14 explored the normaldisordered distinction, with an emphasis on the role of the value component that requires that only harmful conditions can be disorders. However, given that symptoms listed in disorder categories are generally harmful, most changes to diagnostic criteria that address conceptual validity are attempts to ensure that disorder categories also satisfy the dysfunction requirement that distinguishes disorder from the many other forms of harm to which human beings are subject. Here, in the December issue, the 2 In Review papers comprising part 2 on the disorder-normal distinction emphasize the dysfunction aspect of the concept of disorder. Dr Dan J Stein 15 argues that recent developments in cognitive science can help to guide us in understanding the process of inference from symptoms to dysfunction that is at the heart of the diagnostic act. We, First and Wakefield, 16 then focus not on the further analysis of the concept of disorder but rather on conceptualizing and elaborating how in fact diagnostic criteria accomplish the task of ensuring that symptoms imply dysfunction, and the strategies by which the definition is implicitly used to design diagnostic criteria that distinguish disorder from nondisordered forms of misery.
